

## DIDO, AENEAS, AND IULUS: HEIRSHIP AND OBLIGATION IN *AENEID* 4

The purpose of this paper is to examine afresh ways in which Virgil accords significance to Iulus in the fourth *Aeneid* as his father's son and heir, and employs that significance in justifying Aeneas' decision to leave Carthage. I shall attempt this examination from three perspectives. First, I hope to demonstrate how, by causing us to reflect on the interplay between *Aen.* 4.327–30 and lines from Catullus 61, Virgil emphasizes Iulus' position and reinforces the contrast between him and the child by Aeneas that Dido wants but does not have. Secondly, I shall look at the speeches of Mercury and Aeneas which frame Dido's complaint of childlessness, and show how they invoke legal language and concepts which tend to support a sense of the justice of Aeneas' actions by reference to his duties to his son. Finally, I shall revisit the question of how Dido's lament for *parvulus Aeneas* (*Aen.* 4.328–9) might call to mind Cleopatra's ill-fated son, Caesarion; my aim here will be to explore the way in which this reminiscence locates the relationships between Aeneas, Iulus, and Dido in the context of a recent dispute about heirship and paternity, and thereby provides further support for an emphasis on Iulus' rights and Aeneas' obligations to him at the end of the Carthaginian episode.<sup>1</sup>

### I

Saltem si qua mihi de te suscepta fuisset  
ante fugam suboles, si quis mihi parvulus aula  
luderet Aeneas, qui te tamen ore referret,  
non equidem omnino capta et deserta viderer. (*Aen.* 4.327–30)

I begin with this proposition: that when Virgil combines *parvulus* and a proper name and *ore* in these lines, which are taken from Dido's first speech after she discovers Aeneas' design to leave Carthage, he prompts the reader to think of Catullus 61.<sup>2</sup>

The relevant lines from Catullus 61 are those (conventionally) numbered 209–18:

Torquatus volo parvulus  
matris e gremio suae  
porrigens teneras manus  
dulce rideat ad patrem  
    semihiante labello.  
sit suo similis patri  
Manlio et facile omnibus  
noscitur ab insciis,

<sup>1</sup> AMDG. I am grateful to all those who took time to read, comment on, and improve earlier drafts of this paper, including David West, Roland Mayer, John A. Eidinow, my Merton colleagues Nicholas Richardson, Simon Pulleyn, Alastair Blanshard (who also, with her permission, kindly gave me access to exchanges between himself and Jane Gardner on the subject of adoption), and Audrius Zakarauskas, and the anonymous referee for *CQ*. The mistakes and misinterpretations are my own.

<sup>2</sup> It is helpful that Catullus 61 also makes its presence felt at other points during Aeneas' visit to Carthage, as *CQ*'s referee reminds me: see *Aen.* 1.693 (*amaracus*), with R. G. Austin, *P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Liber Primus* (Oxford, 1971), ad loc.; and *Aen.* 4.133, 141, with id., *P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Liber Quartus* (Oxford, 1955), ad loc.

et pudicitiam suae  
matris indicet ore.<sup>3</sup>

The comparison has, of course, been noted by critics,<sup>4</sup> but the context of these lines has not been sufficiently explored in their effect on the reader of Dido's speech.

First, it is to be noticed that these lines of Catullus are a celebratory anticipation of birth: the pathos of Dido's expression of desire for a child, intense as it is when considered simply on its own, becomes yet more affecting when related to, and contrasted with, the anticipated celebration of Torquatus and his wife. Whereas the child of Torquatus and Junia is keenly awaited at the time of Catullus' poem, Dido's time for a child by Aeneas is suddenly past: she will now never give birth to such a child, she will never enjoy this reminder of Aeneas and her relationship with him; and, we might add, posterity will never have this evidence of her union with him.

Secondly, the son who is to be born will be able to bear witness to his ancestry by his likeness to his father. Just as Catullus invokes the likeness to his father of *parvulus Torquatus*, likeness to his father is one of the attributes which Dido would have desired for her *parvulus Aeneas*: ore in *Aen.* 4.329 (*qui te tamen ore referret*) picks up ore in Catullus 61.218, and brings with it recollection of the stanza *sit suo similis patri* . . .<sup>5</sup> Torquatus' son, when he is born (as he surely will be), will be the image of his father; Aeneas' son by Dido will never now be born, and there will be no living image of Aeneas in the halls of Carthage.

But, in contrast with the child who will never be, Dido and the reader have already encountered a small boy who looks like Aeneas: his son Iulus. Before this point in the poem, *parvus* has been used twelve times: on five occasions (all occurring, in fact, in Aeneas' narrative of the fall of Troy in Book 2) it has been attached to the name of Iulus (*Aen.* 2.563, 674, 677, 710, 723), and on none of the remaining occasions is it used with a personal name (*Aen.* 2.213, 320; 3.276, 349, 685, 402; 4.176).<sup>6</sup> And we know of his likeness to Aeneas, because it is precisely this which causes Dido to hug him on her lap in the early stages of her love for Aeneas: *gremio Ascanium genitoris imagine capta | detinet* (4.84–5). There is here an echo of (and contrast with) Catullus' *parvulus Torquatus* who stretches out his hands *matris e gremio* (61.210): Dido has had a *parvulus Aeneas* on her lap, who is the very image of his father, but, crucially, she is not his mother and he, of course, is not the product of her union with Aeneas. Dido's *parvulus Aeneas* can only be imagined; *parvus Iulus*, the real *parvulus Aeneas*, is, on the other hand, flesh and blood.

Thirdly, the birth anticipated by Catullus is that of a legitimate son to a properly married couple. Presented with the childless end of a relationship of at best dubious status,<sup>7</sup> Dido can only dream of how her child would have been acknowledged by

<sup>3</sup> The text cited is that of G. P. Goold, giving *omnibus* . . . *insciis*, as proposed by Dawes.

<sup>4</sup> For example, Austin, (n. 2, 1955), ad loc.; A. S. Pease, *Publi Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Liber Quartus* (Cambridge, MA, 1935), ad loc.

<sup>5</sup> I have not ignored the attractive suggestion of S. J. Harrison (*AJP* 117 [1996], 285–7) that by ore in 61.218 Catullus is in fact referring to Torquatus' eloquence and wishing it on his son; but it seems to me that Virgil has picked up the word not the sense, and that here we are to think of it in the context of the first part of its stanza.

<sup>6</sup> *Fama* (4.176) is obviously not an exception.

<sup>7</sup> It seems to me to be clear that Virgil did not expect his readers to regard Aeneas and Dido as married. See (as a convenient jumping-off point) N. Horsfall, *A Companion to the Study of Virgil* (Leiden, 1995), 128, with S. Treggiari, *Roman Marriage: Iusti Coniuges from the Time of Cicero to the Time of Ulpian* (Oxford, 1991), 43–54; also D. C. Feeney, 'The taciturnity of

Aeneas: *si qua mihi de te suscepta fuisset | ante fugam suboles*.<sup>8</sup> It is an irony for the reader to appreciate, too, that whereas for Junia the birth (and features) of her *parvulus Torquatus* will demonstrate her *pudicitia*, for Dido the birth (and features) of the child she desires would have been a permanent reminder of the *pudor* lost because of her relationship with Aeneas.<sup>9</sup> In contrast, Iulus is the offspring of a marriage of uncontested validity, that between Aeneas and Creusa; there is no doubt about his legitimacy, or, as importantly, his acceptance by his father.

In summary, these reflections on Dido's words and Catullus's lines demonstrate, I suggest, a contrast made between the actual and the imagined offspring of Aeneas, emphasising in various ways the reality of Iulus as an individual, and the reality of his relationship with Aeneas as his acknowledged and legitimate son.<sup>10</sup>

## II

This idea can be worked out further. Mercury's parting shot, when delivering to Aeneas Jove's command to move on, is in these terms (*Aen.* 4.272, 274–6):

si te nulla movet tantarum gloria rerum,  
Ascanium surgentem et spes heredis Iuli  
respice, cui regnum Italiae Romanaque tellus  
debetur.

Iulus is referred to by Mercury as Aeneas' *heres*, his heir: *heres* is an unpoetical word,<sup>11</sup> a term of Roman law with precise meaning;<sup>12</sup> it appears twice in the *Aeneid* (4.274, 7.424), each time in reference to the succession to the kingdom in Italy. The introduction by Mercury of the word *heres* here, coupled with reference to Iulus' expectations, *spes*,<sup>13</sup> suggests that, so far as the gods are concerned, Aeneas' failure to pursue his destiny in Italy would be tantamount to disinheriting his son.<sup>14</sup> Disinheritance of a son was permissible in Roman law, but 'social feeling in Rome was against a man cutting out his children, unless they were plainly bad or unfilial':<sup>15</sup> since unjust disinheritance was an offence against a testator's *officium pietatis*, the implication here is clearly that Aeneas will be acting undutifully to Iulus if he does not leave him an Italian kingdom.<sup>16</sup> Mercury seems to add a further facet to his

Aeneas', in S. J. Harrison (ed.), *Oxford Readings in Vergil's Aeneid* (Oxford, 1990), 167–90 (reprinted from *CQ* 33 [1983] 204–19 with corrections), at 167–8.

<sup>8</sup> On the levels of meaning of *suscepta*, see Austin, (n. 2, 1955), ad loc.; unlike Austin, however, I see no reason to limit the word to one level of meaning.

<sup>9</sup> As Dido tells Aeneas: *te propter eundem | extinctus pudor* (*Aen.* 4.321–2); see also 4.9–29, 54–5.

<sup>10</sup> I am not here making any comment about the intimacy of their personal relationship (or rather its depiction): see further Feeney (n. 8), at 181–4, and R. O. A. M. Lyne, *Further Voices in Vergil's Aeneid* (Oxford, 1987), 151–5.

<sup>11</sup> As an examination of the entry in *TLL* shows.

<sup>12</sup> See conveniently A. Berger, *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law* (Philadelphia, 1953), 486–7.

<sup>13</sup> For *spes* as the expectation of inheritance, cf. Hor. *Serm.* 2.5.47, Tac. *Ann.* 1.8.

<sup>14</sup> It has to be recalled that a son in his father's *potestas* was *suus heres*, that is he had a right of succession to the estate in the event of his father's intestacy and in the case of testation he had to be specifically disinherited if the will was to be valid.

<sup>15</sup> J. A. Crook, *Law and Life of Rome, 90 B.C.–A.D. 212* (Ithaca, 1967), 122. Cf. E. Champlin, *Final Judgments: Duty and Emotion in Roman Wills 200 B.C.–A.D. 250* (Berkeley, 1991), 14–15; Sen. *Clem.* 1.14.1.

<sup>16</sup> Acceptance of the view that a testator might be acting undutifully in disinheriting his

argument by telling Aeneas that the kingdom in Italy *debetur*, is owed, to Iulus: the suggestion may be that, from the divine perspective, Iulus is in this respect his father's creditor.<sup>17</sup>

All this puts in rather stronger terms the effect of Jove's question, *Ascanione pater Romanas invidet arces?* (*Aen.* 4.234): Mercury is instructing Aeneas in his duty, and from his language we (and Aeneas) are to understand that Iulus has a formal, divinely sanctioned, and, above all, just claim on his father and, so to speak, on his father's estate.<sup>18</sup>

In his reply to Dido, Aeneas recognizes the justice of Iulus' claim on him, and in similarly formal language: [*terret*] *me puer Ascanius capitisque iniuria cari, | quem regno Hesperiae fraudo et fatalibus arvis* (4.353–4). The phrase *capitis iniuria* is not, so far as I can tell, a set legal phrase, but one might think none the less that it had a distinct flavour of the lawcourts,<sup>19</sup> suggesting unjust and unlawful conduct adversely affecting the civil status and rights of another.<sup>20</sup> *Fraudo*, too, has a legal flavour;<sup>21</sup> and this is, in fact, the only place in the poem where Virgil employs the verb *fraudare*. In the context where we have been told that the Italian kingdom *debetur*, is owed, to Iulus, it is not, perhaps, far-fetched to think here of fraud on creditors (*fraudare creditores | in fraudem creditorum agere*), that is, where a debtor takes steps to defraud his creditors by diminishing his property.<sup>22</sup> Of course, it is not literally true that Iulus is Aeneas' creditor, or that Aeneas is defrauding this creditor by dissipating his estate, but the language used here suggests the strength of the obligation which Aeneas has towards his son and, conversely, the strength and justice of his son's claim on him.<sup>23</sup>

Although expressed here in a striking way as a matter of legal rights claimed and obligations owed personally between the generations of Aeneas' family, the propriety,

children and that they might have legitimate grounds for complaint is evidenced by the action known as the *querela inofficiosi testamenti* (which probably originated at the end of the republican period) by which disinherited children might sue for the portion they would have obtained on intestacy: Crook (n. 15); H. F. Jolowicz and B. Nicholas, *Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law* (Cambridge, 1972<sup>3</sup>), 198; J. F. Gardner, *Family and Familia in Roman Law and Life* (Oxford, 1998), 37–9. The basis of the action was that 'the testator had offended against the duty to respect the family, the *officium pietatis*': Champlin (n. 15), 15; E. Renier, *Etude sur l'histoire de la querela inofficiosi en droit romain* (Liège, 1942), 39–124.

<sup>17</sup> See Berger (n. 12), 425, s.vv. *debere, debitor, debitum*.

<sup>18</sup> R. C. Monti, *The Dido Episode and the Aeneid: Roman Social and Political Values in the Epic* (Leiden, 1981), 47, commenting on Jove's speech, observes, '[a]s a last resort, he must appeal to Aeneas' sense of obligation to his son and his descendants to extricate him from Dido and Carthage', but he does not explore the language in which Mercury transmits this appeal, so as to identify the type of obligation which the reader would sense in Mercury's appeal, although this would follow naturally from the terms of his own inquiry. There is a similar deficiency in Monti's discussion of lines 350–5 of Aeneas' speech (p. 43).

<sup>19</sup> In a wider sense, of course, the whole speech has the flavour of the lawcourts; at 356–9, for example, Aeneas is plainly giving evidence.

<sup>20</sup> '*Caput* is civil capacity' (W. W. Buckland, *A Text-book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian*, rev. by P. Stein [Cambridge, 1963<sup>3</sup>]), 135. *Iniuria* 'might mean any unlawful interference with right': *ibid.*, 589. The phrase recalls *capitis diminutio*, the loss of civil status, even without Seneca, *Dial.* 2.5.4: *Omnis iniuria deminutio eius est in quem incurrit . . .* and perhaps it is not going too far to remember that *capitis diminutio* might interfere with succession-rights (see e.g. Paul. *Dig.* 37.1.6.1).

<sup>21</sup> See Berger (n. 12), 477.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> Monti (n. 18), 43, comments, 'Aeneas has to consider the debt of affection which he owes to his father, his son, and his own people. Italy is their right.' The point is that Virgil establishes that Italy is Iulus' right precisely by using the language of *legal* rights and obligations against a background of certain social expectations.

indeed the necessity, of Iulus' succession have been expressed earlier in the poem. The prophecy of Jove in Book 1 has revealed that the kingdom and Iulus' succession to it are preordained (*Aen.* 1.267–71);<sup>24</sup> in Book 2, attention is given to the bond between father and son, and to Iulus' position as the youngest of his line: his escape with Aeneas and Anchises is as much a pledge of Troy's continuity (in this case a dynastic continuity) as the rescue of the Penates;<sup>25</sup> and in Book 3, Apollo prophesies the dominion of the House of Aeneas *et nati natorum et qui nascentur ab illis* (*Aen.* 3.97–8). The ground is prepared, therefore, for the reader to acknowledge Iulus' rights and the justice of his claims, as Mercury does, and as Aeneas is suddenly brought to do. Aeneas' recognition of his specific duty to his son is a further reason for Virgil to award him the epithet *pius* at line 393.<sup>26</sup>

This acknowledgement of Aeneas' *filius-heres* together with the formality of the language in which it is achieved reinforce, therefore, our sense of the weight of Aeneas' obligation to leave this Carthaginian kingdom of the imagination (of which Dido's non-existent child is, as it were, a part) and settle his real heir in a real Italian kingdom; they also reinforce, I suggest, our sense of the justice both of the obligation itself and of enforcing it. Meditating on the allusion to Catullus further reinforces our appreciation of the significance of the differences between the real and the imaginary child.

### III

From these perspectives I now wish to turn to the ghostly presence of Ptolemy XV Caesar in Dido's lament for her never-to-be-conceived *parvulus Aeneas*.<sup>27</sup>

The parallel between Dido and Queen Cleopatra VII in the fourth *Aeneid* has drawn critical attention to the historical resonances that might be evoked by Dido's reference to the child she does not have.<sup>28</sup> Pease commented that 'the ancestor of Augustus, that stout defender of the marriage tie, must not be represented as compromised in his relations with Dido, and in this he stands in contrast, not only to the lovers of Medea and other great heroines, but also to Antony and Caesar in their relations to Cleopatra'.<sup>29</sup> On the basis that Octavian's claim to authority was owed to his adoption by Caesar, however, Barrett disputed the probability that Virgil was criticizing Caesar by contrast;<sup>30</sup> he suggested that this passage in Dido's speech may instead have supported efforts to discredit the paternity that Antony and others had claimed for Caesarion as the supposed son of Caesar and the queen. The purpose of the passage, on Barrett's reading, is not the contrast but the similarity between Aeneas and Caesar: Aeneas has not produced a child by a foreign mistress, *ergo* Caesar, his analogue for these purposes, did not father Cleopatra's son, and Caesarion's claim is accordingly false.

<sup>24</sup> And at line 288 Jove also emphasizes the descent of the Julii from Iulus.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Anchises' words at *Aen.* 2.701–3: *sequor et qua ducitis adsum, | di patrii; servate domum, servate nepotem. | vestrum hoc augurium, vestroque in numine Troia est.*

<sup>26</sup> As the critics have observed, the epithet is not otherwise used in this book, and not, in fact, since *Aen.* 1.305: see Austin, (n. 2, 1955), ad loc.

<sup>27</sup> I say 'never-to-be-conceived', and it seems to me that it is Dido's belief that she is not already carrying a child. But (as *CQ*'s referee has emphasized to me) the reader is naturally unable to know whether Dido has in fact conceived a child by Aeneas or not, something with which Ovid will later make play (see *Her.* 7.133–4): this latent possibility of an existing rival for Iulus may add a further resonance to my discussion below.

<sup>28</sup> Pease (n. 4), 24–8, identifies and discusses the parallels between the two queens.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 327 in his note to *saltem*.

<sup>30</sup> A. A. Barrett, 'Dido's child: a note on Aeneid 4.327–30', *Maia* 25 (1973), 51–3.

Whatever else one may think of Barrett's thesis,<sup>31</sup> the focus on Caesarion in the context of this speech is not misplaced, and can be supported. The situation alone might have been enough to suggest such a focus, but the way in which Dido is made to express her desires gives the thoughtful reader a more specific indication. According to Dio, it was Queen Cleopatra who called her son, Ptolemy Caesar, 'Caesarion' or 'little Caesar';<sup>32</sup> as to Dido's speech, critics have noted that *parvulus* in line 328 is Virgil's only use of a diminutive adjective in the *Aeneid*,<sup>33</sup> and it has also been noted that this is the only occasion in Book 4 when Aeneas' name is pronounced by Dido.<sup>34</sup> If we try to use these observations together, we can, I suggest, arrive at the conclusion that when the Cleopatra-like Dido speaks in this way of the son she desires by Aeneas, using the unique combination of a diminutive (of a word in any case meaning 'little') and the hoped-for father's name, the reader is specifically invited to bring to mind 'Caesarion', a diminutive nickname similarly formed on the basis of the (putative) father's name and given to the child by his mother.

If, as I have argued, it is correct to see specific reference to Caesarion here, we can, I think, find further significance for Iulus in this perception. To do this, we need briefly to consider Caesar's last will, Octavian's status under it,<sup>35</sup> and the position of Caesarion himself.

Caesar's will of September 45 B.C. poses some difficult questions, made more difficult, we should readily suspect, because of dust thrown up by the rival propaganda of Octavian and Antony. Several points emerge, however, which can perhaps be briefly stated.

First, although according to the will Octavian shared his institution as heir to Caesar's estate with his cousins L. Pinarius and Q. Pedius,<sup>36</sup> and although the notorious 'adoption' in *ima cera*<sup>37</sup> was nothing of the kind, but rather a *condicio nominis ferendi*,<sup>38</sup> the fact that Octavian was Caesar's heir, and his right (or gladly assumed obligation) to use Caesar's name, were vital to the initial credibility of his approach to power.<sup>39</sup> Secondly, Octavian's attempt (in the face of Antonian opposition) to ensure

<sup>31</sup> The logic of the argument is, to my mind, not strong.

<sup>32</sup> Dio 47.31.5: ἡ τε Κλεοπάτρα . . . τὸν υἱόν . . . Πτολεμαῖον μὲν ὠνόμαζεν, ἐπλάττετο δὲ ἐκ τοῦ Καίσαρος τετοκέναι καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο Καίσαρίωνα προσηγόρευε . . .

<sup>33</sup> For example, Austin (n. 2, 1955), ad loc.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 141.

<sup>35</sup> For simplicity's sake, I shall call him Octavian throughout.

<sup>36</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 83.2: *tres instituit heredes . . . Gaium Octavium ex dodrante, et Lucium Pinarium et Quintum Pedium ex quadrante reliquo.*

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.: *in ima cera Gaium Octavium etiam in familiam nomenque adoptavit . . .*

<sup>38</sup> Testamentary adoption did not exist. See W. Schmitthenner, *Oktavian und das Testament Cäsars: eine Untersuchung zu den politischen Anfängen des Augustus* (Munich, 1973<sup>2</sup>), 39–64; R. Syme, 'Clues to testamentary adoption', *Roman Papers IV* (Oxford, 1988), 159–70; Champlin (n. 15), 144–5; Gardner (n. 16), 126–30. Pace M. E. Deutsch, 'Caesar's son and heir', *UCPCP* 9 (1928), 157, n. 35. The procedures adopted by Octavian seem to have been modelled on the procedures that would have been used had Caesar adopted him during his lifetime: M. Kaser, *Das römische Privatrecht I* (Munich, 1971), 349. For an individual who was *sui juris* 'adoption' took place by *adrogatio*, which was procedurally distinct from adoption *stricto sensu*: see Gardner (n. 16), 126–7. *Adrogatio* required the passage of a *lex curiata*; Octavian was *sui juris* by the time of Caesar's death.

<sup>39</sup> The point is that his position under the will gave Octavian a link to Caesar that with careful use could establish him in a position that no one could better; his testamentary heirship was used as a foundation for his claim to political succession. The legal manoeuvres that accompanied his inheritance were surely designed to give greater weight to his political claims. See Gardner (n. 16), 129; C. Kunst, 'Adoption und Testamentadoption in der späten Republik', *Klio* 78 (1996), 87–104.

the passage of a *lex curiata* after his arrival in Rome in May 44 B.C., probably for the purpose of giving the *condicio nominis ferendi* the effect of a real adoption, and the eventual passage of the *lex* soon after Octavian's acquisition of the consulship in August 43 B.C.,<sup>40</sup> indicate a wish to give substance to the relationship suggested by the name, that is to become (legally) Caesar's son.<sup>41</sup> Thirdly, as we shall see, the sources suggest that Antony regarded the existence of Caesarion and the claims that could be made on his behalf as a useful means of attempting to undermine the moral legitimacy of Octavian's claims as Caesar's son and heir.

Traces of the debate and of the pamphleteering that accompanied it survive in the sources:<sup>42</sup> Antony's announcement to the Senate that Caesar had acknowledged Caesarion as his son (Suet. *Iul.* 52.2); his appeal to Caesar's friends, including C. Oppius, to confirm the prince's parentage and Oppius' pamphlet in fact denying it;<sup>43</sup> the assertion by Octavian's partisans that the absence of reference to Caesarion in the will demonstrated that he was not Caesar's child;<sup>44</sup> counter-assertions of the proof of paternity offered by the similarity of Caesarion's appearance and bearing to Caesar's.<sup>45</sup> It should be borne in mind, too, that Octavian regarded Caesarion's existence as enough of a challenge to his otherwise unique position to arrange his death in 30 B.C., once victory over Cleopatra and Antony had offered the chance.<sup>46</sup>

But however much Antony might have sought to detract from Octavian's legal position as Caesar's *son* by promoting the natural claim of Caesarion, he could not, of course, employ the same technique to challenge Octavian's position as Caesar's *heir*: as to Octavian's institution there was no doubt, whereas, even assuming Caesar's paternity, Caesarion was illegitimate in Roman law, and by virtue of that illegitimacy was outside Caesar's *potestas* and had no claim to be *suus heres*.<sup>47</sup> Hence, in the absence in

<sup>40</sup> Dio 45.5.3–6.2, 46.47.4; App. *BCiv.* 3.94.

<sup>41</sup> Enabling him, after Caesar's deification in 42, to call himself *divi filius*; although not apparently before c. 40 B.C., if the evidence of coins may be relied upon.

<sup>42</sup> See K. Scott, 'The political propaganda of 44–30 B.C.', *MAAR* 11 (1933), 7–49; L. Ross Taylor, *The Divinity of the Roman Emperor* (Middletown, CT, 1931), 136; M. Gelzer, *Caesar: Politician and Statesman*, trans. P. Needham (Oxford, 1968), 257, n.1.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.: *M. Antonius adgnitum etiam ab eo senatui adfirmavit, quae scire C. Matium et C. Oppium reliquosque Caesaris amicos; quorum Caius Oppius, quasi plane defensione ac patrocinio res egeret, librum edidit, non esse Caesaris filium, quem Cleopatra dicat*. I have avoided the question (which I do not need to answer for the purposes of this paper) whether all this took place in 44 or 32 B.C.: see Gelzer (n. 42), 257, n. 1; M. P. Charlesworth, *CQ* 27 (1933), 176.

<sup>44</sup> Nic. Dam. *Vit. Caes.* 20.68: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔφασκον . . . βασιλῖδα Κλεοπάτραν αὐτῷ τεκεῖν παῖδα Καίσαρίωνα φοιτήσασαν εἰς εὐνήν· ὅπερ αὐτὸς ἤλεγξεν ἐν ταῖς διαθήκαις ψεῦδος ὄν. See Schmitthenner (n. 38), 15–16.

<sup>45</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 52.1: *quem quidem nonnulli Graecorum similem quoque Caesari et forma et incessu tradiderunt*. The opposite point, that it was Octavian who resembled Caesar, may have been intended by those of his coins from the triumphal period which seem to stress the similarity between his portrait on one side and Caesar's on the other: see J. Pollini, 'Man or God: divine assimilation and imitation in the late republic and early principate', in K. A. Raaflaub and M. Toher (edd.), *Between Republic and Empire: interpretations of Augustus and his principate* (Berkeley, 1990), 352; A. Alföldi and J.-B. Giard, *NumAntCl* 13 (1984), 147–61; J.-B. Giard, *RN* 13 (1971) 90–105.

<sup>46</sup> Suet. *Aug.* 17.5, Plut. *Ant.* 82.1, Dio 51.15.5; this contrasts with his generous treatment of the children of Antony and the queen.

<sup>47</sup> See generally Treggiari (n. 7), 44–51, and Gardner (n. 16), 252–3; more specifically, Schmitthenner (n. 38), 63. The claim that Helvius Cinna (conveniently dead) had prepared a bill on Caesar's instructions *uti uxores liberorum quaerendorum causa quas et quot vellet ducere liceret* may have been an attempt to make the best of the difficulty (Suet. *Iul.* 52.2).

the will of specific provision for him, which, as we have seen and as Octavian's party emphasized, had not been made, he had no claim on Caesar's name or estate.

It is against this historical background, as well as the literary background of Catullus 61, that I consider we should read Dido's *parvulus Aeneas*. Such evocations of recent historical figures and events are not alien to Virgil's poetic technique.<sup>48</sup> I have argued that the speeches of Mercury and Aeneas should be read as conveying, by their choice of language, the necessity and justice of Iulus' inheritance (from which will follow the necessity and justice of Aeneas' departure from Carthage). If my further contentions are right, this reading can pray in aid the reader's recognition or assimilation of the historical background which is here invoked: that is, the legal necessity (as *heres*) and justice (as *heres* and as *filius*) of Octavian's inheritance, and the absence of any justifiable claim by Caesarion, neither *heres* of any kind nor *filiusfamilias*, illegitimate, unprovided for by the will, and not entitled to consideration.<sup>49</sup>

I am aware that in advocating this interpretation of the interplay between the historical events surrounding Caesar's will and this episode in the poem I might seem to be assuming the lack of an alternative to Octavian's version of history. I hope it will be realized, however, that in what I have proposed it does not matter whether Caesarion was or was not actually Caesar's natural son. The things that matter, and of which I claim to hear the echo in the passages under discussion, are the legal positions of the respective parties, the existence of the political controversy, the partial foundation of that controversy upon the legal positions, and the way in which the moral and political self-presentations of Octavian, and what he gained from them, appear to have been partly the fruit of manipulation of the legal position.

#### IV

If we have these matters in mind, as I suggest we should, then the circumstances of Aeneas' departure, and his motivation for it, acquire a further significant basis of interpretation. By the interplay between Catullus 61 and Dido's lament, the reader is brought to appreciate more deeply the position of Iulus, and the differences between the relationship that produced Iulus and the one that has not produced *parvulus Aeneas*. In the speeches of Mercury and Aeneas the claim of Aeneas' really existing *heres* and *filius* is posited, acknowledged, and justified in formal, juristical language. The evocation of Caesarion and the Caesarion-problem provides another perspective from which to realize Iulus' right to succeed.

The duty for which Aeneas leaves Dido and Carthage is not, therefore, a matter merely of following the cruelly imposed and coldly executed orders of the gods, it is also a profoundly Roman matter of family: of Iulus' right to his inheritance, and Aeneas' obligation to provide it; of the moral relation between a father and his son and heir.

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<sup>48</sup> See e.g. A. M. Bowie, 'The death of Priam: allegory and history in the *Aeneid*', *CQ* 40 (1990), 470–81.

<sup>49</sup> It does not seem to me to be an objection to the interpretation I propose that in this respect it depends upon recognizing aspects of Julius Caesar in Aeneas (and, indeed, Octavian in Iulus) when in other situations aspects of other Roman leaders, especially, of course, Augustus, can be identified in him. Part of the richness of Virgil's invention derives from this shifting recognition. Cf. Pease (n. 4), 29.